Public Good and Conflict of Interest, NCI

The problem with our "good schools"

When you have domains of learning and activity that are specialized and you are encouraged to trust the experts rather than coming to your own determinations, then not only are you cut off from the learning and the skill involved in that domain, but you are also cut off from the possibility of taking responsibility in that domain. A specialized domain is not the responsibility of the non-specialist. What happens, however, when the entire network of human activity has become specialized is that, for any given thing, the grand majority of people are not responsible. Not only are they not responsible, but they cannot “take” responsibility. Taking responsibility becomes a question of accreditation. And here we come full circle to the role our universities play in contributing to the cultural state of barbarism.
By creating and legitimizing and normalizing the extraordinary authority of the expert, of the specialist, the universities legitimize the adoption in the general population of a very unhealthy default position—"whatever the matter at hand, it is almost certainly not my responsibility, and this is not a problem.” If I trust in the “good schools”, then I know that, whatever the problem, there are experts whose responsibility it is, there are specialists looking into these things, and the specialists looking into these things are the trustworthy product of our trusted universities.

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When we have knowledge and skills developed by specialists, and research initiatives managed by these specialists, and when the outcomes produced by these initiatives are further curated and communicated by specialists, then this small clique of specialists, this group of experts who possess the precious cultural capital of their specialized expertise–these individuals then become targets. These specialists become targets for those parties, those organizations, those corporate power-structures that stand to benefit from predetermined positions, policies, or outcomes in the specialists’ domains. As with public institutions in general, departments of universities, and specialists within these departments, can become subject to corporate capture. That is, they can fall under the sway of programs, organizations, corporations that direct them in their activities, in their research, in their policy recommendations. And one common and highly effective manner in which this is accomplished is by controlling funding.
In this game of influence, an organization that can shape research agendas and influence funding priorities—including ethics priorities--does not need to direct research and other initiatives entirely according to its own priorities. It doesn’t have to say that no research can be done in a direction that might lead to outcomes contrary to its interests. Instead, it will raise less alarm and thereby increase efficiency if it simply floods the board with funding that tends to favour its direction of choice. There will be copious funds available if you investigate this particular avenue–the efficacy, say, of mRNA vaccines in lowering rates of hospitalization. But there will be very little funding available if you want to investigate the efficacy of any off-patent drugs in early COVID treatment. When it comes to games of influence, such an organization will be even more effective, if it can coordinate with other corporate interest groups and begin working on a global level, creating a global framework for advancing research and determining national research priorities. Then, through their cooperative effort, this network of powerful corporations can not only channel their own funds but can begin directing and channeling the funds put forward by public research bodies that don’t want to be left behind, especially when progress is taking place “at the speed of science”.