Two problems in the Chip War:

Video: Two problems in the Chip War: we need China to build semiconductors, and we need China to buy them 晶片戰爭的兩個問題：我們需要中國製造半導體，我們需要中國購買半導體

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-02/us-asks-south-korea-to-toughen-up-export-controls-on-china-chips
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2024/09/02/tech/south-korea-us-china-chip/
https://waferpro.com/chinas-dominance-in-the-global-silicon-supply/
https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=383248
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-02/china-warns-japan-of-retaliation-over-potential-new-chip-curbs
https://www.rabobank.com/knowledge/d011371771-mapping-global-supply-chains-the-case-of-semiconductors

Korean tech companies are examples of the issues we face in our semiconductor export bans with China. China is dominant in key chokepoints of the supply chain, especially high-grade polysilicon and wafers, and certain rare earth elements necessary for the production of the newest-generation chips.

Korean firms also are heavily exposed by their own factory production, which is concentrated in China for the manufacture of intermediate components.

Most of all, though, is the chips firms' reliance on China as a sales channel. China is by far the biggest buyer of semiconductors, and the rest of the world simply cannot replace Chinese firms as buyers. So to comply with US and EU demands for further chip restrictions is to imperil the survival of our own companies.

韓國科技公司就是我們在對華半導體出口禁令中所面臨的問題的例子。 中國在供應鏈的關鍵節點上佔據主導地位，尤其是高品級多晶矽和矽片，以及生產最新一代晶片所需的某些稀土元素。

韓國企業也因自己的工廠生產而受到嚴重影響，這些工廠生產集中在中國，用於製造中間零件。

不過，最重要的是晶片公司對中國作為銷售管道的依賴。 中國是迄今為止最大的半導體買家，世界其他國家根本無法取代中國企業成為買家。 因此，遵守美國和歐盟進一步限制晶片的要求就會危及我們自己公司的生存。