OP2406-21-2 After Action Report

OP2406-21-2 After Action report

OP2406-21-2
Intelligence staff for 4th Battalion, Chernarus 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, detected strong indications of separatist activity north of the village of Salash in the Leskovets region. Some of that activity reported included visits by local separatist militia groups seeking to requisition food, cash, and recruits from the village.

The data was provided by wiretapped communications, including calls from burner phones provided by Chernarus intelligence groups, and electronic media intercepts. Those data did not indicate that a separatist had occupied The village, but were very likely to attempt to take over the village.

Salash is nestled into a thickly wooded area in central Leskovets. Because of this, mobile operations are difficult at best, although the battalion intelligence staff indicated that the terrain would not stop separatists from driving into, and through the area to the south.

Operations staff for 4th Battalion assembled a task force consisting of three T-72 tanks, which comprised the task force's strike element, and two BMP rifle squads. The recon element consisted of two BRDM scout cars.

The tactical plan called for a probe of the area immediately to the south of Salash, using scout cars, bolstered by the strike element. The plan called for 2nd Squad, supported by Tank 3 to launch probing attacks via the main east-west highway from the West, while Command Squad, supported by Tank 1 and Tank 2 would probe north along the main north-south road.

Command Squad was ambushed by an enemy technical which killed the Task Force commander, which also cut off all comms of the Command Squad. Battalion operations staff ordered commander 2nd Squad to take over task force, to locate Command Squad and reestablish comms.

All the while this regrouping was taking place, enemy armor was attacking through Salash, and attempting to overrun positions of 2nd Squad and Tank 3. Additionally, Tank 3 was destroyed while enemy armor supported by infantry groups attempted to overrun Command Squad.

Operations staff ordered all friendly forces to stand fast as the operations staff assembled reinforcements, and an entirely new command element to conduct operations.

Once the regrouping was complete several minutes later, the new commander for the task force ordered 1st Squad (formerly Command Squad) to probe north to the eastern side of the village, as Command Squad with its BMP ifv probed up the middle. What the task force commander discovered during his probe, was that during the regrouping, Tank 1 and Tank 2 both, in conjunction with an Su-25 ground interdiction fighter, had caught and eliminated a large number of enemy forces including their armor in the woods immediately to the south of the village.

The new Command Squad and 2nd Squad were ordered to probe into the southernmost row of buildings in Salash and to clear them out of enemy infantry. These room clearing activities took several minutes, as enemy infantry, including Wagner group operators, Spanish militia, and Russian militia, continued to pour in from the north. Task Force commander also ordered Tank 1 and Tank 2 to close on the main crossroads, where they engaged enemy heavy armor, including two enemy T-55 tanks.

Apparently satisfied that Salash was not to be taken over by separatist forces, operations staff ordered the operation to end, and the task force to retreat south to a rally point in Damyanovo village.

Losses were heavy. Tank 1 and Tank 3 were both destroyed. 1st Squad lost eight, while 2nd Squad lost five. Reinforcing Rifle Squad 1 lost one.

Field counts of enemy losses included five BMPs, three BRDMs, two T-55 tanks, one BTR-80A, one technical, and one Wagner operated Mi-8 gunship.

A post operation analysis by battalion intelligence staff concluded that separatist forces were severely damaged in their attempt to take over the village of Salash, despite all the problems with comms and command that took place early on in the operation.

A similar post-operation analysis by battalion operations staff enumerated several problems with the task force which included a lack of personal equipment for use in night operations, and no anti-aircraft protection.

Command staff will seek to correct these deficiencies for the next operation.