American Muslims Facts vs. Fiction vs. Islamic Militant Organization vs, Sharia Law ?

American Muslims Facts vs. Fiction is an 11-minute film that uses research from The Gallup Organization, The Pew Forum, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, The U.S. Counterterrorism Center and other leading research organizations to address questions Americans ask about their Muslim neighbors. The film debunks stereotypes and separates many of the prevailing fictions about Islam and American Muslims by featuring leading researchers, religious authorities and the results of studies conducted by these organizations.

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Muslims Are Not Terrorists: A Factual Look at Terrorism and Islam
I am tired of having to repeatedly say that Muslims are not terrorists. It is time we silence this Islamophobia with facts. Every time an act of terror or shooting occurs, Muslims closely watch the news with extreme trepidation praying that the suspect is not Muslim. This is not because these terrorists are likely to be Muslim but rather because in the instances where they happen to be, we see amplified mass media coverage and extreme unjustified hatred towards Muslims.

As a Muslim, I am tired of condemning terrorist attacks being carried out by inherently violent people who hijack my religion. I am tired of condemning these attacks to people who are calm and apathetic when Muslims are killed by these same radicalized terrorists.

I am tired of hearing the word "terrorist" not being used when the suspect in a terrorist attack is a non-Muslim. I am tired of the "mentally disabled" excuse being recycled when the suspect in a terrorist attack is a Caucasian. I am tired of seeing hundreds of terrorist attacks carried out by non-Muslims not get the same coverage of even a single terrorist attack where the suspect happens to be Muslim.

Above it all, I am tired of having to repeatedly say that Muslims are not terrorists. It is time we silence this Islamophobia with facts. My next five points will prove once and for all that Muslims are not terrorists:

1. Non-Muslims make up the majority of terrorists in the United States: According to the FBI, 94% of terrorist attacks carried out in the United States from 1980 to 2005 have been by non-Muslims. This means that an American terrorist suspect is over nine times more likely to be a non-Muslim than a Muslim. According to this same report, there were more Jewish acts of terrorism in the United States than Islamic, yet when was the last time we heard about the threat of Jewish terrorism in the media? For the same exact reasons that we cannot blame the entire religion of Judaism or Christianity for the violent actions of those carrying out crimes under the names of these religions, we have absolutely no justifiable grounds to blame Muslims for terrorism.

2. Non-Muslims make up the majority of terrorists in Europe: There have been over one thousand terrorist attacks in Europe in the past five years. Take a guess at what percent of those terrorists were Muslim. Wrong, now guess again. It's less than 2%.

3. Even if all terrorist attacks were carried out by Muslims, you still could not associate terrorism with Islam: There have been 140,000 terror attacks committed worldwide since 1970. Even if Muslims carried out all of these attacks (which is an absurd assumption given the fact mentioned in my first point), those terrorists would represent less than 0.00009 percent of all Muslims. To put things into perspective, this means that you are more likely to be struck by lightening in your lifetime than a Muslim is likely to commit a terrorist attack during that same timespan.

4. If all Muslims are terrorists, then all Muslims are peacemakers: The same statistical assumptions being used to falsely portray Muslims as violent people can be used more accurately to portray Muslims as peaceful people. If all Muslims are terrorists because a single digit percentage of terrorists happen to be Muslim, then all Muslims are peacemakers because 5 out of the past 12 Nobel Peace Prize winners (42 percent) have been Muslims.

5. If you are scared of Muslims then you should also be scared of household furniture and toddlers: A study carried out by the University of North Carolina showed that less than 0.0002% of Americans killed since 9/11 were killed by Muslims. (Ironically, this study was done in Chapel Hill: the same place where a Caucasian non-Muslim killed three innocent Muslims as the mainstream media brushed this terrorist attack off as a parking dispute). Based on these numbers, and those of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the average American is more likely to be crushed to death by their couch or television than they are to be killed by a Muslim. As a matter of fact, Americans were more likely to be killed by a toddler in 2013 than they were by a so-called "Muslim terrorist".

When a drunk driver causes a car accident, we never blame the car manufacturer for the violent actions of that driver. This is because we understand that we cannot blame an entire car company that produces millions of safe vehicles just because one of their cars was hijacked by a reckless person who used it to cause harm. So what right do we have to blame an entire religion of over 1.6 Billion peaceful people because of the actions of a relatively insignificant few?

I will not deny that terrorism is a real threat, it definitely is. However, it is extremely incorrect to associate the words "Muslim" and "terrorist" when literally all the facts implore you to do otherwise. The only way that we as Americans can defeat terrorism at home and across the world is by accurately targeting its root causes. There have been 355 mass shootings in the United States this year and falsely blaming Muslims for the San Bernardino shooting will do absolutely nothing to address this serious problem. It is time that we begin addressing terrorism on an educated and factual level.

As an American Muslim, I plead you all to deeply consider the facts mentioned here the next time you see a news headline about Muslims and terrorism. Martin Luther King Jr. once said, "Hate cannot drive out hate, only love can do that". We cannot allow the disparity in media coverage to blind us from the facts and turn us into hateful people, we are smarter than that.

Al Qaeda (AQ) is one of the most powerful terrorist organizations in the world, with a long history and a global reach. It is composed of a core group of operatives and leadership largely based in Pakistan and Afghanistan and maintains relationships with a number of affiliate organizations around the world.

al-Qaeda, Arabic al-Qāʿidah (“the Base”), broad-based militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s.

Al-Qaeda began as a logistical network to support Muslims fighting against the Soviet Union during the Afghan War; members were recruited throughout the Islamic world. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization dispersed but continued to oppose what its leaders considered corrupt Islamic regimes and foreign (i.e., U.S.) presence in Islamic lands. Based in Sudan for a period in the early 1990s, the group eventually reestablished its headquarters in Afghanistan (c. 1996) under the patronage of the Taliban militia.

Al-Qaeda merged with a number of other militant Islamist organizations, including Egypt’s Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, and on several occasions its leaders declared holy war against the United States. The organization established camps for Muslim militants from throughout the world, training tens of thousands in paramilitary skills, and its agents engaged in numerous terrorist attacks, including the destruction of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (1998), and a suicide bomb attack against the U.S. warship Cole in Aden, Yemen (2000; see USS Cole attack). In 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda staged the September 11 attacks against the United States. Within weeks the U.S. government responded by attacking Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Thousands of militants were killed or captured, among them several key members (including the militant who allegedly planned and organized the September 11 attacks), and the remainder and their leaders were driven into hiding.

The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 challenged that country’s viability as an al-Qaeda sanctuary and training ground and compromised communication, operational, and financial linkages between al-Qaeda leadership and its militants. Rather than significantly weakening al-Qaeda, however, these realities prompted a structural evolution and the growth of “franchising.” Increasingly, attacks were orchestrated not only from above by the centralized leadership (after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, based in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions) but also by the localized, relatively autonomous cells it encouraged. Such grassroots independent groups—coalesced locally around a common agenda but subscribing to the al-Qaeda name and its broader ideology—thus meant a diffuse form of militancy, and one far more difficult to confront.

With this organizational shift, al-Qaeda was linked—whether directly or indirectly—to more attacks in the six years following September 11 than it had been in the six years prior, including attacks in Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Israel, Algeria, and elsewhere. At the same time, al-Qaeda increasingly utilized the Internet as an expansive venue for communication and recruitment and as a mouthpiece for video messages, broadcasts, and propaganda. Meanwhile, some observers expressed concern that U.S. strategy—centred primarily on attempts to overwhelm al-Qaeda militarily—was ineffectual, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, al-Qaeda was thought to have reached its greatest strength since the attacks of September 2001.

On May 2, 2011, bin Laden was killed by U.S. military forces after U.S. intelligence located him residing in a secure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 31 miles (50 km) from Islamabad. The operation was carried out by a small team that reached the compound in Abbottabad by helicopter. After bin Laden’s death was confirmed, it was announced by U.S. Pres. Barack Obama, who hailed the operation as a major success in the fight against al-Qaeda. On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda released a statement announcing that Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s long-serving deputy, had been appointed to replace bin Laden as the organization’s leader.

Madrid train bombings of 2004, coordinated near-simultaneous attacks targeting commuter trains in Madrid on the morning of March 11, 2004. Beginning at 7:37 AM and continuing for several minutes, 10 bombs exploded on four trains in and around Atocha Station in the city’s centre, leaving 191 dead and more than 1,800 injured. Occurring just three days before Spain’s general elections, the attacks had major political consequences.

Both the Spanish government and the Spanish media immediately attributed the bombings to ETA, a Basque separatist organization whose campaign of violence over more than 30 years had claimed the lives of at least 800 people. Indeed, Ángel Acebes, the country’s interior minister, claimed, “There is no doubt ETA is responsible.” In an outpouring of grief and defiance, the following day an estimated 11 million Spaniards, including some 2.3 million in Madrid alone, participated in demonstrations against the violence and in support of the victims. This display of unity rapidly broke down, however, as the police investigation began to focus on the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda. On March 13, as the first arrests were being made, the government continued to blame ETA.

That evening spontaneous protests took place in Madrid, Barcelona, and other cities as demonstrators chanted, “We want to know the truth before we vote.” With some 90 percent of Spaniards opposed to Prime Minister José María Aznar’s support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Islamic connection inevitably put Iraq back on top of the political agenda. This favoured the opposition Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), which had strongly opposed the war. On March 14 the PSOE scored an upset victory at the polls, and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was sworn in as prime minister three days later.

In October 2007, 18 Islamic fundamentalists of mainly North African origin and three Spanish accomplices were convicted of the bombings (seven others were acquitted), which were one of Europe’s deadliest terrorist attacks in the years since World War II.

al-Shabaab, (Somali: “the Youth”) also spelled al-Shabab, Arabic in full Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn, Somali-based Islamist militant group with links to al-Qaeda. Beginning in 2006, the group waged an insurgency against Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

Al-Shabaab originated as a militia affiliated with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a federation of local and clan-based Islamic courts that had been founded in southern Somalia in 2004 to combat the lawlessness and banditry afflicting the area since the collapse of the government of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. From about 2004 this militia acted as an armed wing of the ICU, incorporating fighters from the disbanded Somali militant Islamist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiyyah as well as a number of fighters who had fought for the al-Qaeda network or received training from it. The group came to be known as al-Shabaab, meaning “the Youth,” and it was led by Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, a Somali operative reportedly trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Ideologically, al-Shabaab took a more extreme stance than the ICU as a whole, espousing a puritanical version of Islam at odds with the Sufi-influenced form practiced by many Somalis.

In early 2006 al-Shabaab fighters played a prominent role supporting the ICU in combat against a coalition of Mogadishu warlords that the United States covertly supported in an attempt to prevent the spread of militant Islamism. The ICU defeated the warlords and took control of Mogadishu in June 2006. That month the ICU also changed its name to Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SSICC). The victory strengthened al-Shabaab, allowing fighters to take possession of arsenals belonging to the warlords. The SSICC’s takeover in Mogadishu was a threatening development for the TFG, then operating from Kenya and the Somali city of Baydhabo, and for the TFG’s international supporters, especially the United States, which feared that the SSICC would provide a haven for al-Qaeda.

International intervention came at the end of 2006, when a U.S.-backed Ethiopian force joined with TFG troops to fight the SSICC, which was quickly defeated and dissolved. Al-Shabaab, however, remained intact and began to mount a campaign of bombings and attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian forces in Somalia. Civilians, journalists, and international aid workers also became targets for attacks, as did the African Union peacekeeping force (AMISOM) authorized by the UN Security Council in February 2007. The death of Ayro in a U.S. air strike in 2008 did little to slow al-Shabaab’s insurgency. In October 2008 the TFG signed a power-sharing agreement with members of the former SSICC, providing for the incorporation of moderate Islamists into the government. Al-Shabaab, still fiercely opposed to any compromise with the TFG, denounced the agreement even though it set a timetable for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.

Al-Shabaab continued to extend the area under its control in 2009, banning behaviours that it deemed un-Islamic and implementing punishments including beheading, stoning, and amputation for offenders. In July 2010 al-Shabaab suicide bombers staged the group’s first major attack outside Somalia, killing about 75 people gathered in Kampala, Uganda, to watch a screening of a World Cup football (soccer) game. Al-Shabaab claimed the attack as retaliation for Ugandan troops’ participation in AMISOM. Al-Shabaab drew further international condemnation for first banning and then restricting assistance from international aid groups in southern Somalia during a deadly drought and famine in 2011.

By mid-2011 al-Shabaab appeared to be on the defensive. Worn down by repeated clashes with AMISOM forces, the group retreated from Mogadishu in August 2011. In October 2011 the group was forced to fight on a second front when several thousand Kenyan soldiers entered southern Somalia in response to a series of alleged al-Shabaab attacks and kidnappings in Kenya. The Kenyan force in Somalia officially merged with AMISOM in June 2012, and an AMISOM offensive in October of that year succeeded in driving al-Shabaab out of Kismaayo, the port city that had been the group’s last urban stronghold.

In February 2012 a video released jointly by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda announced that al-Shabaab had formally pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda network.

Al-Shabaab launched its deadliest attack outside of Somalia in several years on September 21, 2013, when militants stormed a shopping mall in Nairobi, killing at least 65 people. Kenyan police cornered the gunmen in the shopping mall, resulting in a siege that lasted several days. On April 2, 2015, al-Shabaab struck again in Kenya, killing more than 140 people and injuring dozens more in a raid on a university in Garissa.

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, (born April 27, 1968, Kuwait), Kuwaiti-born militant who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He was part of some of the most ambitious terrorist conspiracies discovered to date, including a thwarted plot to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific Ocean.

Born in Kuwait to Pakistani and Palestinian parents, Yousef traveled to the United Kingdom to study electrical engineering and improve his English language skills. He returned to Kuwait after completing his education but left after the Iraqi invasion in 1990, eventually making his way to Afghanistan. There he received training in bomb-making and traveled abroad to work as a recruiter for the nascent al-Qaeda organization. He met with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines in an effort to establish a foothold in the region, and in September 1992 Yousef flew to New York City. There, he made contact with radical Egyptian-born cleric Omar Abdel Rahman, and Yousef gathered the personnel and material that he would need to execute his planned attack on the World Trade Center.

Over the subsequent months, Yousef and his confederates assembled an approximately 1,500-pound (680-kilogram) bomb. They placed it in a rented van, and on February 26, 1993, the bomb was detonated in an underground garage in the World Trade Center. Six people were killed and over 1,000 were injured in the attack, and that evening Yousef was on a flight bound for Pakistan. Yousef’s associates—Mohammad Salameh, Mahmud Abouhalima, Nidal Ayyad, and Ahmad Ajaj—were tried and convicted for their roles in the bombing.

It is believed that by July 1993, Islamist militants had approached Yousef about coordinating and carrying out an assassination plot against Benazir Bhutto in advance of the October 1993 Pakistani general elections. During one failed attempt, a detonator exploded in Yousef’s face and the men abandoned the plot to rush Yousef to a hospital. Investigators alleged that Yousef again failed to assassinate Bhutto when a gun to be used by a sniper was not delivered in time for one of her public addresses.

By spring 1994, Yousef was in Thailand, where he coordinated a plot to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. On March 11, 1994, a bomb was loaded into a stolen van and driven toward the embassy, but the van was in an accident and the driver fled. Authorities discovered the bomb, still undetonated, days after the van was impounded. In June 1994 Yousef arranged the bombing of a Shīʿite shrine in Mashhad, Iran, in which 26 people were killed. He then left for the Philippines, where he trained members of Abu Sayyaf in the use of explosives. At the time, Osama bin Laden was financing Abu Sayyaf, and through the group it is believed that bin Laden had requested that Yousef assassinate U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton during his trip to the Philippines in November 1994. The venture was a logistical nightmare and proved too difficult for Yousef.

Yousef turned his attention to a plot he had been working on since arriving in Manila, called Project Bojinka (Serbo-Croatian for “loud explosion”). Project Bojinka was Yousef’s most elaborate and ambitious scheme to date. He planned to blow up 11 U.S. airliners almost simultaneously over the Pacific Ocean, using small but strategically placed bombs made of liquid nitroglycerin, which could pass through airport detectors unnoticed and be assembled in an airplane bathroom using little more than two batteries and a watch.

During this time Yousef had also hatched a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II. On December 8, 1994, Yousef rented a street-facing room along the route the pope would travel on his visit to Manila. Three days later, Yousef boarded Philippines Airlines flight 434 in Manila. Once on board, he assembled a bomb in the bathroom and placed it under his seat. Yousef disembarked in Cebu, and the bomb exploded while the plane was en route to Tokyo, killing one passenger and injuring several others. Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the bombing, while Yousef continued to fine-tune his plot to assassinate the pope.

On January 6, 1995, while mixing chemicals intended for bombs, Yousef and an associate started a small fire in their room. When police arrived, both men had already fled, leaving behind bomb-making materials and Yousef’s laptop. The laptop provided authorities with information related to the planned assassination of the pope, as well as a file named “Bojinka,” which detailed how five men were to plant bombs on 11 American planes in the Far East. The first scheduled bombing was January 21, 1995, just weeks away.

After fleeing, Yousef returned to Pakistan, where he tried to enlist the help of a man who later alerted authorities to his presence in Islamabad. On February 7, 1995, Pakistani authorities captured Yousef in his hotel room. He was flown to the United States after his arrest to await trial for the World Trade Center bombing and the Bojinka plot. On September 5, 1996, Yousef was convicted for the bombing and assassination conspiracy, and in November 1997 he was also found guilty of the World Trade Center bombing. The verdicts carried a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

USS Cole attack, attack by Muslim militants associated with the organization al-Qaeda against a U.S. naval destroyer, the USS Cole, on October 12, 2000. Suicide bombers in a small boat steered their craft into the side of the USS Cole, which was preparing to refuel in the harbour in the Yemeni port of Aden; the blast ripped a 1,600-square-foot (150-square-metre) hole in its hull and left 17 sailors dead and 39 wounded.

USS Cole attack
USS Cole attack
USS Cole attack
USS Cole attack
In 2004 a Yemeni court tried Saudi-born ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Nashīrī in absentia for the USS Cole attack and sentenced him to death; U.S. military prosecutors filed charges against him in 2008. The U.S. proceedings were complicated by an admission by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that waterboarding—an interrogation tactic that simulates drowning, banned by the CIA in 2006—was used during Nashīrī’s imprisonment at Guantánamo Bay; it was unclear whether evidence obtained through such means would be admissible in court.

Omar Khadr case, the imprisonment, trial, and eventual release of Omar Khadr, a Toronto-born Canadian, captured by U.S. soldiers after a firefight in Afghanistan in 2002 when he was 15 years old. The only minor since World War II to be convicted of purported war crimes, Khadr was held for nearly 13 years.

Capture in Afghanistan
Khadr’s immigrant parents were Ahmed Said Khadr, from Egypt, and Maha Elsamnah, a Palestinian. His father worked for Muslim charities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the family moved frequently between Canada and Pakistan, becoming friendly with terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. Ahmed was arrested in 1995 in Pakistan in connection with a bombing of the Egyptian embassy but was freed a year later. Ahmed was later a suspect in the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.

In 2002, following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent United States invasion of Afghanistan, Omar Khadr’s father sent him to Afghanistan to act as a translator. Later that year, Khadr, age 15, was wounded and captured by American forces after he was the only one of a group of militants to survive a firefight. Khadr was accused of throwing a number of grenades that killed U.S. Sgt. Christopher Speer and blinded Sgt. Layne Morris in one eye. He later said he did throw a grenade but does not know whether it was the one that killed Speer.

The Americans moved their captive to Bagram air base in Afghanistan for medical treatment and interrogation before transferring him in October 2002 to the notorious prison at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Khadr had just turned 16 and was one of the youngest prisoners ever held at Guantánamo.

Polarized public opinion
The Canadian government initially opposed Khadr’s transfer to Guantánamo Bay. It also urged the U.S. to take into account his juvenile status. The Americans ignored Canada’s requests. For reasons that remain unclear, attitudes in Ottawa then hardened, and the Liberal government began playing down the issue of Khadr’s age.

Omar Khadr’s situation was also complicated by a CBC documentary in March 2004, in which his mother and sister in Toronto expressed views sympathetic to al-Qaeda and critical of Canada. The documentary angered many Canadians and hardened attitudes toward the young prisoner, paving the way for thoroughly polarized public opinion on his case.

Guantánamo interrogations
In early 2003 and again in 2004, Canadian intelligence officials were allowed to interrogate Khadr at Guantánamo Bay on the condition that they shared the information with the Americans, who were preparing to prosecute him. They agreed. In an effort to soften Khadr in advance of the questioning, the Americans deprived him of sleep by constantly moving him from cell to cell.

In 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada, over the objections of the Canadian government, ordered the government to turn over video of the interrogations. It was the first of three favourable decisions Khadr would win against the government before Canada’s top court. The video, some of which showed Khadr sobbing for his mother, caused a public outcry.

In 2010, documents released by WikiLeaks, a private organization dedicated to publishing leaked secrets, showed the Canadian government had decided not to ask for Khadr’s repatriation, as other Western countries had done for their citizens imprisoned at Guantánamo.

In January 2010 the Supreme Court again ruled against the government, finding that the Guantánamo interrogations had violated Khadr’s constitutional rights—and barring such further questioning. However, the court refused to demand his repatriation. Ottawa’s response was to ask the U.S. not to use evidence gleaned from the interrogations in its prosecution of Khadr.

Supporters
Following a visit by one of Khadr’s Canadian lawyers to King’s University College in Edmonton, some of the school’s professors, led by Arlette Zinck, began corresponding with Khadr in Guantánamo Bay. They devised a special curriculum for him to follow and began tutoring him long-distance. After his transfer to prison in Edmonton years later, the tutoring continued in person. The school eventually offered Khadr a full-time placement he could accept after his release.

Groups such as Free Omar Khadr Now and Amnesty International also advocated for him. These groups criticized the federal government’s use of Khadr as a poster child for its tough-on-terrorism approach. They also chastised the media for referring to him as a war criminal, given the tenuous status of the U.S. military commission that convicted him.

Military commission
To prosecute what U.S. Pres. George W. Bush called the “worst of the worst,” the U.S. opted to bypass civilian courts and instead try Guantánamo captives, including Khadr, by military commission. The commissions were based on the well-known system of military courts-martial. However, human-rights and legal groups—even the United States Supreme Court—criticized the commissions for lack of due process and for criminalizing conduct retroactively. The commissions made no distinction between youths and adults, and their rules allowed for indefinite detention even after an acquittal.

In October 2010 Khadr pleaded guilty before a military commission to five war crimes, in exchange for a further eight-year sentence. He signed a lengthy stipulation of facts in which he admitted killing Sgt. Christopher Speer, trying to kill Sgt. Layne Morris, and being a member of al-Qaeda. He would later say the guilty plea, urged on him by his lawyers, was the only way for him to be returned to Canada. The U.S. would have had the power to keep him at Guantánamo even if he had been acquitted.

Transfer to Canada
Khadr’s plea bargain said he could transfer to Canada to serve out the remainder of his eight-year sentence after one further year at Guantánamo. The Canadian government, prior to the agreement, had indicated it would be amenable to such a transfer. But the year passed with no sign of his return. The Americans blamed Canada for dragging its heels. Canada suggested the Americans had failed to fill out the proper paperwork. Either way, Public Safety Minister Vic Toews finally signed off on the repatriation, and Khadr was transferred to Canada in September 2012.

Canadian prison authorities immediately classified Khadr as a maximum-security prisoner, despite the fact he had been considered a minimum-security inmate at Guantánamo and one who had never caused any problems. He was incarcerated at Millhaven Institution in eastern Ontario. Khadr’s maximum-security status—which determined his prison programming and his parole chances—was questioned by the federal prisons ombudsman, to no avail.

In April 2013 the federal government, in an extraordinary intervention, overruled the warden of Millhaven to block an approved interview between Khadr and the Canadian Press. Khadr’s lawyers said it was part of the government’s strategy to demonize him as a hardened terrorist.

Khadr was transferred to Edmonton Institution in May 2013 and then to Bowden Institution in Innisfail, Alberta, in February 2014 as a medium-security prisoner. More than a year later, in April 2015, the Correctional Service of Canada classified Khadr as a minimum-security inmate.

Young offender status
In September 2013 Khadr’s lawyers argued in the Alberta courts that the eight-year sentence handed him by the U.S. military commission could only be interpreted as a youth sentence under the International Transfer of Offenders Act. (The military commission did not distinguish between youths and adults). Youth status would require the government to treat him as a young offender and have him serve his time in a provincial facility. The federal government fought the application. It argued Khadr had received five concurrent eight-year terms and that four of them were adult sentences, so he properly belonged in an adult penitentiary. Although he did not speak, Khadr appeared in court for the arguments—his first public appearance since his capture.

Almost a month later, Alberta Justice John Rooke sided with Ottawa. Khadr appealed. In a strongly worded decision delivered in July 2014, the Alberta Court of Appeal said Khadr’s sentence could only be interpreted as a youth sentence. The federal government asked the Supreme Court of Canada to hear the matter, which it agreed to do. In an unusual twist, the country’s highest court took just 30 minutes following oral arguments on May 14, 2015, to throw out the government’s appeal, confirming Khadr’s youth status under Canadian law.

Release on bail and completion of sentence
In March 2015, Khadr’s lawyers turned again to the Alberta courts to argue he should be freed on bail pending his appeal in the U.S. of his war-crimes convictions. They argued that the appeal was dragging on and might not be dealt with before his sentence expired in October 2018. They also said the 28-year-old Khadr had long been a model prisoner. The government opposed the application.

On April 24, 2015, Justice June Ross sided with Khadr. She ordered both sides back to court on May 5 to set terms for his interim release. On that morning, the government sought an emergency stay of Ross’s decision to grant Khadr bail pending his appeal. On May 7 Justice Myra Bielby rejected the government’s request. Within hours, Khadr was released on bail on conditions including that he wear an electronic tracking bracelet and that he reside with his lawyer, Dennis Edney. In 2017 the Canadian government settled a lawsuit that alleged it had violated Khadr’s rights, among other claims. It apologized to Khadr “for any role Canadian officials played in relation to his ordeal abroad and any resulting harm” and agreed to pay him $10.5 million (Canadian). Although Khadr’s sentence was initially to end in October 2018, his release on bail had frozen the time remaining at about 3.5 years. However, in March 2019 Justice Mary Moreau ruled that his sentence was completed, having applied the time of his conditional release toward his sentence. As a result, Khadr’s bail conditions were lifted.

9-11 Commission, also spelled 9/11 Commission, formally National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, bipartisan study group created by U.S. Pres. George W. Bush and the United States Congress on November 27, 2002, to examine the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The commission’s report served as the basis for a major reform of the U.S. intelligence community, marking some of the most far-reaching changes since the creation of the modern national security bureaucracy at the start of the Cold War in the late 1940s.

The commission was initially to be chaired by former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and former U.S. senator George Mitchell, but each resigned shortly after their appointments due to conflicts of interest. Former New Jersey governor Thomas Kean and former congressman Lee Hamilton subsequently agreed to chair and vice-chair the commission, which was composed of five Republicans and five Democrats. A staff of experts led by Philip Zelikow prepared the report after interviewing 1,200 individuals and studying thousands of classified and unclassified reports. Nineteen days of public hearings were held. The commission’s findings, compiled as The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, were delivered in July 2004.

The report detailed the planning and execution of the al-Qaeda attacks, the response of the intelligence and policy communities to the intelligence warnings of an attack in the preceding months, and the response of the national security system to the attacks when they occurred. The commission concluded that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had inadequately assessed the threat posed by al-Qaeda and had not taken sufficient steps to disrupt its planning. The report said that the most important failure in both the intelligence and policy communities was one of imagination, in understanding the depth of the threat al-Qaeda posed.

The 9/11 Commission Report narrated in detail the development of al-Qaeda, its evolution into the organization that carried out the September 11 attacks, and the central leadership role played by Osama bin Laden. The report discussed al-Qaeda’s attacks on American targets before September 11, 2001, with a special focus on the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000. The commission also studied foiled al-Qaeda attacks like the so-called “Millennium Plot” to attack Los Angeles International Airport with a suitcase bomb in late December 1999. Much of the data on al-Qaeda’s planning and execution of the September 11 and other attacks derived from the statements of captured al-Qaeda operatives.

The commission also carefully assessed the role of foreign states in the plot and the attacks. Significantly, it concluded that Iraq had no role in the events of September 11, 2001, and was not involved in the al-Qaeda plot. This was notable because alleged Iraqi involvement in the attacks had served as a casus belli for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite the commission’s finding that there was “no credible evidence” linking the government of Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, members of the Bush administration continued to assert that such ties existed. The report noted that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens but found no evidence of Saudi government participation in the attacks. The commission assessed that Pakistan played a central role in the development of Islamist extremism and urged the administration to take steps to strengthen democracy there. It applauded the administration for its intervention in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, and urged a fully resourced effort to build a stable government in that country. The commission reviewed evidence of Iran’s involvement with al-Qaeda and suggested that further investigation was needed in this area.

The report concluded with a series of recommendations for reforming and restructuring the U.S. intelligence community and other national security agencies to deal with the threat of 21st-century terrorism. It called for the creation of a national intelligence director with authority over all agencies in the intelligence community; this suggestion led to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). It also called for the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to replace the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which had been created in May 2003; the NCTC was duly created in the aftermath of the report.

The commission also recommended extensive changes in the manner in which the CIA and FBI conduct their work. The CIA was mandated to put a higher emphasis on human intelligence collection programs and to expand its analytical capabilities. The FBI was encouraged to develop new intelligence-gathering capabilities and develop an analytical cadre to match its traditional field agent structure. Above all, both agencies were tasked with sharing information about future threats and working collaboratively to combat them.

The commission’s work and its final report received a generally positive response from both Republicans and Democrats. The report itself became a best seller and was lauded for the quality of its prose. The New York Times even cited its “uncommonly lucid, even riveting” style, unusual for a government report by a large number of experts.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, (born March 1, 1964, or April 14, 1965, Kuwait), Islamist militant who, as an operational planner for al-Qaeda, masterminded some of that organization’s highest-profile terrorist operations, most notably the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

Prior to his birth, Mohammed’s parents immigrated to Kuwait from Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Mohammed was raised in Kuwait, attending public high school there, and he became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a teenager. In 1983 he moved to the United States to attend Chowan College (now Chowan University) in Murfreesboro, North Carolina. He transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, and he earned a degree in mechanical engineering in 1986. After graduating, Mohammed traveled to Afghanistan, where he is believed to have received terrorist training during the Soviet occupation of that country.

Although he later claimed responsibility for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Mohammed first came to international attention for his participation in the so-called Bojinka Plot, a deadly and wildly ambitious plan concocted by Mohammed’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef. The conspirators, based in Manila, aimed to blow up 11 U.S.-bound transpacific airliners with virtually undetectable bombs. Other elements of the plot involved attacks on Pope John Paul II, U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton, and civilian nuclear power plants. Philippine officials discovered the plot in January 1995 when a fire started in the Manila apartment where Yousef and a confederate, Abdul Hakim Murad, were building bombs. When Murad returned to the apartment, he was arrested. Yousef fled the country but was captured in Pakistan in February 1995 and extradited to the United States.

One proposed aspect of the Bojinka Plot involved hijacking an aircraft and using it as a missile to attack the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mohammed took this plan to Osama bin Laden in 1996, with the suggestion that it be used to attack symbolic targets in the United States. It is believed that bin Laden approved the plan at some point in late 1998 or early 1999, and Mohammed began his formal affiliation with al-Qaeda. Mohammed, along with bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, began assembling the hijacker teams. In early December 1999 Mohammed held an instructional meeting with three al-Qaeda operatives who would carry out the September 11 attacks.

After those attacks, Mohammed’s cachet within al-Qaeda skyrocketed. He was involved in other plots against the United States, including the attempted “shoe-bombing” of an American Airlines jet by Richard Reid that was foiled by passengers on December 22, 2001. Mohammed also claimed to have beheaded The Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002, a claim that was later verified by independent sources. In early 2003 Mohammed was planning an attack on London’s Heathrow Airport, but the plot was disrupted by the United States and its allies. Soon after, on March 1, 2003, he was captured by U.S. and Pakistani officers in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

During his interrogation by the CIA, Mohammed was subjected to waterboarding more than 180 times. After spending several years in classified CIA “black site” prisons in central Europe, he was transferred to Guantánamo Bay detention camp in 2006. On February 11, 2008, Mohammed and four others were charged under the military tribunal system with crimes related to the September 11 attacks. At a pretrial hearing, Mohammed admitted his role in dozens of different plots against the United States, and during his arraignment in June 2008, he declared that he wished to represent himself and plead guilty. In November 2009 U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Mohammed and his four coconspirators would be transferred to the United States and tried in a civilian court in New York. In January 2010 military charges against Mohammed were officially dropped by the Pentagon, clearing the way for civilian trials to proceed. In April 2011, however, Holder announced that because of restrictions imposed by Congress, Mohammed would be prosecuted in a military tribunal rather than in a civilian setting. The Department of Defense refiled charges against Mohammed, and he was arraigned for a second time in May 2012. He remained incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay, pending trial.

al-Qaeda in Iraq, formally called Organization of the Base of Jihad in Mesopotamia, also called al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, militant Sunni network, active in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, comprising Iraqi and foreign fighters opposed to the U.S. occupation and the Shiʿi-dominated Iraqi government.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq first appeared in 2004, when Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī, a Jordanian-born militant already leading insurgent attacks in Iraq, formed an alliance with al-Qaeda, pledging his group’s allegiance to Osama bin Laden in return for bin Laden’s endorsement as the leader of al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq. Al-Zarqāwī, who quickly came to be regarded as one of the most destructive militants in Iraq, organized a wave of attacks, often suicide bombings, that targeted security forces, government institutions, and Iraqi civilians. Intending to deepen the sectarian component of the Iraq War, al-Qaeda in Iraq especially targeted Iraqi Shiʿis, sometimes during religious processions or at Shiʿi mosques and shrines. A 2006 attack widely attributed to al-Qaeda in Iraq destroyed the golden dome of Al-ʿAskariyyah Mosque in Sāmarrāʾ, one of Shiʿism’s holiest mosques, amplifying the existing cycle of violent retribution and provoking some of the worst sectarian violence of the post-invasion period.

After al-Zarqāwī was killed by U.S. forces in 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq remained active but faced significant local opposition. Many Iraqi Sunnis who had previously participated in the insurgency were alienated by the group’s often brutal treatment of civilians, as well as its efforts to replace local tribal power structures with one imposed by al-Qaeda in Iraq’s foreign components. In an attempt to shed its image as an exogenous imposition, it merged with smaller, more local insurgent organizations and rebranded itself as the “Islamic State of Iraq.” Still, the organization was severely weakened in 2007 after Sunni tribes, aided and rewarded by the United States, began to form militias known as “Awakening Councils” to expel the organization from their territories. Although those militias, coupled with an increasingly successful effort by U.S. and Iraqi forces to kill al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders, greatly diminished the organization’s power, the network continued for several years to operate on a reduced scale, targeting Shiʿis, Christians, members of the Awakening Councils, and the Iraqi government.

In 2013 the group began enjoying a resurgence as Iraqi Sunnis confronted the increasing sectarianism of the country’s predominantly Shiʿi government. Bolstered further by the recruitment of militants in Syria, it declared itself the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL; also called the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) and broke direction with the broader al-Qaeda franchise.

Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī, also called Abū Yaḥyā Yūnus al-Ṣaḥrāwī and Muḥammad Ḥassan Qāʾid, (born c. 1963, Libya—died June 4, 2012, Hassu Khel, Pakistan), Libyan al-Qaeda strategist who emerged as one of the organization’s top leaders in the early 21st century. Al-Lībī was considered one of al-Qaeda’s main theologians, because the top two al-Qaeda leaders—Osama bin Laden (an engineer) and Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī (a physician)—did not undertake Islamic studies.

Little is known about al-Lībī’s origins, but it is believed that his birth name was Muḥammad Ḥassan Qāʾid and that he assumed the alias Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī in the 1990s when he joined al-Qaeda. He was also known under several other names, including Yūnus al-Ṣaḥrāwī. Al-Lībī’s education was entirely religious; during the 1980s he received five years of training in Mauritania in Sharīʿah (Islamic law). After returning to Libya, he became a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a now-defunct network that in the 1980s attempted to topple Libyan ruler Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi.

As a youth, al-Lībī was influenced by the activities of his older brother ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, who became a noted personality among militant Islamists in Libya and who in the 1980s fought against the Soviet Union in the Afghan War (1978–92). Al-Lībī also joined the Islamic jihadi fighters in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. He then went to Africa but returned to Afghanistan during the period that the Taliban controlled the country after the Soviets had withdrawn.

After the United States invaded Afghanistan following al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Afghanistan’s Taliban regime had provided safe haven to al-Qaeda), al-Lībī was arrested by the Pakistani authorities in the summer of 2002 in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. forces imprisoned him in a maximum-security facility in Bagrām, Afghanistan, but on July 11, 2005, he staged a daring escape with three other al-Qaeda prisoners and found instant fame among fellow militants. In 2006 he appeared in a 54-minute videotape chronicling his capture in 2002, his time spent in prison, and his prison breakout.

After his escape, al-Lībī rapidly ascended the al-Qaeda hierarchy and was named a field commander. The charismatic militant preacher and ideologue helped recruit al-Qaeda members. He appeared in more than a dozen videotapes giving “lessons” on Islam and jihad and rousing Muslims to fight the infidels of the West as well as Muslim and Arab rulers seen as enemies of jihad or sympathetic to Western influence, whom he threatened constantly. Al-Lībī urged Muslims to help al-Qaeda fighters in locales such as Pakistan, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Somalia, and Afghanistan. His videotapes, in Arabic, were placed on extremist Web sites, sometimes with English and Urdu subtitles to reach the broadest-possible audience. Although al-Lībī was sometimes called “Sheikh,” a title reserved for distinguished religious scholars, he lacked the legal authority to issue a fatwa, a legal and authoritative religious decree. In June 2012 U.S. officials announced that he had been killed in a drone strike in Pakistan.

Sharia is a body of religious law that forms a part of the Islamic tradition. It is derived from two main sources: the Quran and Hadith, and refers to the divine counsel that Muslims follow to live moral lives and grow close to God. It serves as Islam's legal system, with thousands of sayings and practices attributed to the Prophet Mohammed that collectively form the Sunna.

What is Sharia law? What does it mean for women in Afghanistan? The Taliban say they will rule Afghanistan according to Sharia, or Islamic law.

The militant Islamist group have taken control after the departure of US and allied forces from the country.

What have the Taliban said?
In the first press briefing after taking power, a Taliban spokesman said issues such as the media and women's rights would be respected "within the framework of Islamic law", but the group has not yet provided any details of what that will mean in practice.

The Taliban have been known for their strict interpretation of Sharia, including punishments such as public executions of convicted murderers and adulterers.

What is Sharia?
Sharia is Islam's legal system.

It is derived from the Quran, Islam's holy book, as well as the Sunnah and Hadith - the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

Where an answer cannot be derived directly from these, religious scholars may give rulings as guidance on a particular topic or question.

In Arabic, Sharia literally means "the clear, well-trodden path to water".

Sharia acts as a code for living that all Muslims should adhere to, including prayers, fasting and donations to the poor.

It aims to help Muslims understand how they should lead every aspect of their lives according to God's wishes.
What does this mean in practice? Sharia can inform every aspect of daily life for a Muslim.

For example, a Muslim wondering what to do if their colleagues invite them to the pub after work may turn to a Sharia scholar for advice to ensure they act within the legal framework of their religion.

Other areas of daily life where Muslims may turn to Sharia for guidance include family law, finance and business. How are rulings made?
Like any legal system, Sharia is complex and its practice is entirely reliant on the quality and training of experts.

Islamic jurists issue guidance and rulings. Guidance that is considered a formal legal ruling is called a fatwa. There are five different schools of Islamic law. There are four Sunni schools: Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanafi, and one Shia school, Jaafari.

The five schools differ in how literally they interpret the texts from which Sharia law is derived.

Interpretation of Islamic law is also nuanced according to local culture and customs, which means Sharia may look quite different in different places.

What are some of the tough punishments?
Islamic scholars says Sharia is mainly a code of ethical conduct and about worship and charity but a part of it deals with crime.

Sharia law divides offences into two general categories: "hadd" offences, which are serious crimes with set penalties, and "tazir" crimes, where the punishment is left to the discretion of the judge.

Hadd offences include theft, which under the strictest interpretations of Sharia, can be punishable by amputating the offender's hand.

There are many safeguards and a high burden of proof in the application of hadd penalties. But experts say that often doesn't happen in practice.

Some countries where Islamic law is applied adopt or enforce such punishments for hadd offences, and surveys have suggested attitudes of Muslims to harsh penalties for such offences vary widely.

Q&A on Female Genital Mutilation

1. What is female genital mutilation (FGM)?

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines FGM as "all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons."

2. What is the difference between female genital mutilation (FGM), female genital cutting (FGC), and female circumcision?

These are all terms used to refer to the practice of removing part of female genitalia for non-medical reasons:

Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a term used by many human rights groups and health advocates to emphasize the physical, emotional, and psychological consequences associated with this procedure. This term also identifies the practice as a human rights violation because of the violence associated with the procedure and because it is mostly carried out on young girls. In its report "They Took Me and Told Me Nothing: Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan," Human Rights Watch uses the term female genital mutilation or FGM.
Female genital cutting (FGC) is a term that is also used by activists and health advocates to show the dangers associated with the practice. This term is sometimes also referred to as female genital mutilation/cutting or FGM/C.
Female circumcision is a term used to describe the practice that does not take into consideration the harm associated with it. It is misleading because it implicitly compares the practice with male circumcision, regardless of the fact that FGM is a considerably more invasive procedure and is not conducted for medical purposes.
3. How many types of FGM are there and what do the different procedures entail?

There are four types of FGM classified by the WHO:

Type I includes the partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or prepuce. Known as clitoridectomy, this is the most common form believed to be practiced in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Type II is a more invasive procedure that includes the partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora. This can be performed with or without excision of the labia majora and is known as excision.
Type III is the most severe type of FGM, known as infibulation, which involves the narrowing of the vaginal orifice with the creation of a seal that is formed by cutting and then stitching the labia minora and/or the labia majora with or without excision of the clitoris.
The fourth type of FGM includes all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia including pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, and cauterization.
4. Which types of FGM are commonly practiced worldwide?

Globally, Type I and Type II are the most common FGM procedures. They account for more than 85 percent of all procedures.

5. At what age do girls undergo FGM?

The WHO notes that most girls undergo this practice between birth and age 15, but FGM occurs at all ages. In some cultures, FGM is used to initiate girls into adulthood and to ensure their marriageability.

6. What is the worldwide prevalence of FGM?

The WHO estimates that more than 140 million girls and women globally have undergone this procedure.

More than 3 million girls in Africa alone are at risk of undergoing this practice every year.

7. In which countries is FGM practiced?

FGM is practiced in more than 27 countries in the African subcontinent, and in communities in Malaysia and Indonesia in Asia. FGM is also common among migrant communities in North America, Europe, and Australia.

In the Middle East and North Africa, FGM is practiced in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, and Iraqi Kurdistan. FGM is also believed to be practiced to a lesser extent among communities in Oman, Jordan, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and was practiced by Falasha Jews in Ethiopia. Recent studies also reveal that FGM is practiced in Kurdish communities in Iran.

8. What are the most common reasons used to justify this harmful practice?

Those who practice FGM justify it with references to various socio-cultural factors. Many people from communities that practice it say that it is rooted in local culture and that the tradition has been passed from one generation to another. Culture and the preservation of cultural identity serve as the underlying impetus for continuing the practice.

Other common justifications for FGM are closely related to fixed gender roles and perceptions of women and girls as gatekeepers of their family's honor, which in many cases is closely linked to strict expectations regarding women's sexual "purity" and lack of desire. In some societies, the prevailing myth is that girls' sexual desires must be controlled early to preserve their virginity and prevent immorality. In other communities, FGM is seen as necessary to ensure marital fidelity and to prevent deviant sexual behavior.

Some of those who support FGM also justify it on grounds of hygiene and aesthetics, with notions that female genitalia are dirty and that a girl who has not undergone the procedure is unclean. Where such beliefs are prevalent, a girl's chances of getting married are materially reduced if she has not undergone the procedure. FGM is also sometimes considered to make girls attractive. Infibulation, for instance, is thought to achieve smoothness, which is considered beautiful.

9. Does any religion condone the practice of FGM?

FGM is practiced among some adherents of the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish faiths. FGM is also practiced among some animists, who believe in the existence of individual spirits and supernatural forces. It is erroneously linked to religion, is not particular to any religious faith, and predates Christianity and Islam. However, some adherents of these religions believe the practice is compulsory for followers of the religion. Because of this flawed link to various religions, and specifically to Islam, religious leaders have an important role to play in dissociating FGM from religion.

For example, while FGM is practiced in Egypt, which is predominantly Muslim, it is not practiced in many other countries with predominantly Muslim populations, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The association of FGM with Islam has been refuted by many Muslim scholars and theologians who say that FGM is not prescribed in the Quran and is contradictory to the teachings of Islam.

10. What is the worldwide legal status of FGM?

Countries with laws or regulations against FGM include Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Ghana, United Kingdom, Guinea, Sudan, Sweden, and the United States.

Canada, France, and the United Kingdom also have existing laws against assault and child abuse that cover FGM.

Governments that support FGM eradication include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda.

11. What are some of the consequences associated with FGM?

FGM has immediate and long-term effects on a woman's physical, sexual, and emotional health.

Physical health implications may include severe bleeding or hemorrhaging, shock from the pain associated with the procedure, risk of infections - especially when unsterile cutting instruments are used or if they are used on several girls at once - and urinary retention. Long-term complications include anemia, cysts, scarring, difficulty passing urine, menstrual disorders, recurrent urinary tract infections, fistulas, prolonged labor, and infertility. More recent research shows that women who have experienced any type of FGM, including clitoridectomy, run a greater risk of complications during childbirth. Pregnant women carry a greater risk of needing a caesarean section or an episiotomy and may experience postpartum hemorrhage.

Sexual and psychosexual health implications may include painful sexual intercourse, sexual dysfunction, and hypersensitivity in the genital area. FGM has also been associated with infertility, which may be attributed to infections or inadequate penetration during sexual intercourse. In communities where fertility and childbirth constitute major roles for women, the failure to produce children is most often blamed on women. This may result in the rejection of the infertile woman by her husband and his family.

Psychosexual problems may result from the pain associated with the procedure, painful menstruation, or painful intercourse that may occur as a result of the procedure. Recurring episodes of lack of sexual desire and enjoyment during intercourse may also result in psychosexual health complications.

Mental and emotional health implications may include depression, anxiety, phobias, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), psychosexual problems, and other mental health problems.

FGM is a medically unnecessary and irreversible procedure that damages the health of millions of girls worldwide.

12. How does FGM violate the human rights of children and women?

FGM violates women's and children's human rights, including their rights to health, to be free from violence, to life and physical integrity, to non-discrimination, and to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. When young girls are cut, they may bleed severely or become susceptible to a serious infection, especially when unsterile cutting instruments, such as knives or razors, are used. The procedure, which serves no medical purpose and is irreversible, inflicts severe pain on young girls and can be life-threatening.

Specific articles in international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), note the obligations of countries that are parties to the treaty to ensure the above-mentioned rights to girls and women.

13. What sorts of international frameworks or strategies have been established to help address FGM?

Treaty monitoring bodies such as the CEDAW Committee, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee Against Torture, and the Human Rights Committee have addressed FGM in their reports to specific governments and recommended actions that can feasibly be taken to help end this harmful practice. United Nations special rapporteurs have also made specific recommendations to governments in countries where FGM is common and recommended specific actions to help eradicate FGM, whether legislative or programs to combat the practice.

UN agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have issued statements against FGM. They have also published documents that contain specific recommendations for policies and programs to help eradicate FGM.

14. Does the medical community have any responsibility for eradicating FGM?

The medical community plays an important role in helping to end this harmful practice. Health care workers have a primary responsibility to disseminate accurate information on the health effects of the practice, and should therefore be fully aware of the consequences of FGM. They should also be able to treat complications resulting from FGM.

The Plan of Action for the Elimination of Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children, prepared in 1994 by the second UN Regional Seminar, developed a state action plan to address harmful traditional practices, including FGM, that includes the following components:

Including instruction on the harmful e

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