Igor Strelkov's SitRep: WHAT'S GOING ON AT KRASNY LIMAN? 30-09-22

Igor Strelkov's SitRep: WHAT'S GOING ON AT KRASNY LIMAN?

NOTE: Situation has changed and continues to change rapidly. Some of Strelkov's assessments may no longer be valid. I further do not agree with Strelkov that Liman will be abandoned. Although the deblockading strike—just like what happened at Balakleya—could be used merely to allow the defenders to retreat, this is not what I am reading the Russian plans to be.

So, what is happening near Liman? From the aggregate of circumstantial data we can say that Liman is surrounded. It is not yet clear whether the encirclement is complete or operational, but—at a minimum—all the roads to the city have either been intercepted by the enemy or are under direct fire.

Frankly speaking, considering the (forced) defensive operation of our troops in the Liman-Yampol-Drobyshevo area objectively, I initially supposed that it had a "constraining" character. That is, the enemy—advancing on the secondary (for us) offensive direction and spending the reserves here to achieve more "media" than decisive military result—was initially constrained by not the most combat-ready units (BARS without heavy weapons) with one purpose: To force the enemy to use up its reserves, and to gain time, so as to allow the main forces of the 20th Army to recover from the defeat at Balakleya-Kupyansk-Izyum, to be replenished with the mobilized forces, and to reinforce defensive positions at the new lines east of Liman.

I also assumed that what the enemy was doing was conducting an "auxiliary" (or even a diversionary) offensive at Liman, masking with it its intended main strike on the Zaporozhye front, and also trying to divert our reserves from there. As a matter of fact, I now consider this danger quite probable, because—unlike in the Liman area—an enemy breakthrough somewhere near Pologi or south of Ugledar would threaten to collapse the front and result in the encirclement of our whole Kherson grouping, leading the enemy to the Crimean Isthmus and, as a result. to the strategic defeat of the Russian Army with unpredictable general consequences.

Why did I believe and still believe that a hard hold of the Liman area is very difficult for us, and its surrender is not critical? Because:

—With the enemy's overall superiority in manpower remaining at 3-4 times, its offensive combat operations in wooded and heavily rugged terrain a priori can and will succeed. It is completely impossible in such conditions to parry the constant pressure of the enemy infantry groups by relying on the superiority in artillery or aviation while hindered by the insufficient numbers of one's own infantry.

—Capturing the Liman area (only Liman—we are not talking about Svatovo, for example) does not give the enemy any further strategic development. Maximum—an operational-tactical advantage, no more than that.

In such circumstances our troops could be tasked to hold the area as long as possible and inflict the maximum losses on the enemy, but not on a rigid defense.
Hence—having received information about withdrawal of Drobyshevo and Yampol by our units [GB: Russian army is reported to be defending on the outskirts of Yampol, having stopped the Ukrainian advance in the area]—I supposed that our troops were pulling out of the created "bag" with the aim of further organised evacuation of Liman itself. I would have done so.

And now, let's move on to what we have at the moment in reality: we have at least operational (or even complete—I do not have exact data) encirclement [GB: Latest reports indicate that there is no complete encirclement]. Which they are now urgently trying to break through from the outside. (And the enemy—one would think—is also not sitting idly by, but instead pounding the de-blocking forces with all the available long-range weaponry. With corresponding losses).